In every geographical region, countries strive to expand their influence and attain a regional status that aligns with their capabilities. Disputes, conflicts, and wars often accompany such states' ascent and attempts to transform into regional powers. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom became a regional power following two essential events: the war between Israel and Gaza and the fall of the Syrian regime last December.
By Ahmad Ghosn
In his book, “The Geopolitics of Regional Systems: Between the Limits of Legitimacy and the Dominance of Power”, Professor Bassel Hajjar divides states into four types. In the case of KSA, we will suffice with explaining the first two types: (1) Regional states, (2) States seeking a regional role, (3) States that form regional axes "Countries whose territories serve as arenas for competition and conflict within the region" (4) Marginal states.
There is no clear, agreed-upon definition of a regional state. However, from a “geopolitical” perspective, this state has geopolitical influence beyond its political borders. Thus, its capabilities allow it to play a political role outside its borders.
The acquisition of regional status comes at the expense of preexisting regional power. However, for Saudi Arabia, achieving this status would come at the expense of more than one regional power, at the expense of Iran, Turkey, and Israel, whose regional influence is declining or they have internal instabilities. In addition, KSA regionality has two main factors: geo-economic and geopolitical.
KSA Geo-Economics importance
Examining the landscape of global initiatives, two key maps emerge in the new world economy: the BRICS map and the Indian corridor map. Notably, Saudi Arabia features prominently on both.
KSA has been invited to join BRICS. The BRICS group is an informal bloc comprising five core members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Four new countries recently joined: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE.
These countries represent 37% of global GDP (based on purchasing power parity) and 44% of the world’s population. The group includes two of the largest oil exporters in the world and two of the top three crude oil importers, China and India. BRICS accounts for 41% of global oil supplies.
What is KSA interested in such a project? Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, the Gulf Research Center Chairman, explains this in his paper, “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Emerging Middle Power in Global Dynamics. “Priorities for the Kingdom’s foreign policy include expanding its economic sphere of influence, broadening its relations, and projecting its power in the rapidly multipolar globe.”
Additionally, the group's economic importance, which includes 44% of the world’s population, opens larger markets for Saudi Arabia and offers more opportunities for foreign investments to participate in the Saudi Vision 2030 project.
Also, KSA signed on a Memorandum of Understanding on September 09, 2023 with the Governments the European Union, the Republic of India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, and the United States of America commit to work together to establish the India – Middle East – Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
IMEC is a trans-continental trade corridor that aims to significantly increase economic integration between the Indian, Middle Eastern, and European markets. Along the way, hydrogen pipelines and optical data cables (undersea) are expected to be laid down.
In September 2023, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticised the project for bypassing Turkey and vowed to pursue an alternative route, the "Iraq Development Road Project." This project envisages connecting the Persian Gulf with Europe through a railway and highway via ports in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iraq, including the under-construction Grand Faw Port.
KSA will have a place at the table that determines the future of the region, no matter what that table looks like or who else is seated at it—this is what distinguishes Saudi Arabia from Iran, Turkey, and Israel.
Geopolitical Shifts Leading to KSA’s Rise
Before December 8, the dominant regional powers were Iran, Israel, and Turkey. Each asserting influence through military interventions, strategic partnerships, and geostrategic location. Despite its economic strength and religious significance, Saudi Arabia played a secondary role, primarily leveraging its financial resources and diplomatic ties rather than directly shaping regional outcomes.
After the 8th of December, it transformed from a "State Seeking a Regional Role" to a "Regional Power," and geoeconomic and geostrategic factors led to this.
Iranian retreat in Syria presented a significant strategic opening for Saudi Arabia to consolidate its regional influence, notably by expanding its presence in Syria and Lebanon. This shift marks a turning point in the regional balance of power. Riyadh is a dominant player, surpassing Turkey, Iran, and Israel in shaping the Middle East’s political landscape.
The weakening of Iran’s strategic depth in Syria directly impacts Hezbollah’s regional operations. With disrupted supply lines and reduced Iranian support, Hezbollah finds itself more isolated than ever.
As a result, Hezbollah faces increasing domestic pressure amid Lebanon’s economic and political crisis, and Hezbollah's political and regional space will be replaced with that of the Lebanese government. Lebanese Army Commander Joseph Aoun’s first trip, upon election as Lebanon’s president, was to Saudi Arabia—a symbolic and strategic move.
By seeking Riyadh’s support, he effectively acknowledged Saudi Arabia’s new role as Lebanon’s key regional patron, evident from Prime Minister Nouaf Salam's latest interview with Al Arabiya. This marks Saudi Arabia’s emergence as the primary external power shaping Lebanon’s future.
With Lebanon now turning to Saudi Arabia for economic and political backing, and Syria increasingly under Saudi influence due to Iran’s retreat, Riyadh has effectively established a form of guardianship over both countries. This enhances its regional credibility and allows it to dictate terms in key geopolitical issues, including the future of Hezbollah, Syrian reconstruction, and broader Middle Eastern diplomacy.
Turkey is facing growing internal instability due to accusations of democratic backsliding and nationwide protests, which have strained President Erdogan’s government. This domestic turmoil diverts attention from Turkey’s traditionally assertive foreign policy, leading to a decline in its proactive regional engagement. As a result, a power vacuum is emerging—one that Saudi Arabia is well-positioned to fill.
One key indication of this shift is Syria’s political realignment. After Turkey supported Ahmad Al-Sharaa in overthrowing the former Syrian regime, his first official visit as president was to Saudi Arabia rather than Turkey.
Diplomatically, this signals a belief in Saudi Arabia’s leadership in the region over Turkey’s. Saudi Arabia is vested in a strong and stable Syria, whereas Turkey might prefer a weaker Syria that remains dependent on Ankara. This difference in strategic outlook underscores the shifting balance of power in the region.
Israel’s ongoing war with Hamas has placed significant strain on its military, intelligence, and diplomatic influence. The prolonged conflict has disrupted regional stability and slowed the progress of normalisation efforts, such as the Abraham Accords.
As Israel grapples with these challenges, Saudi Arabia is seizing the opportunity to position itself as the central Arab mediator in regional affairs. Saudi Arabia’s increasing diplomatic leverage allows it to assert influence in key negotiations, economic partnerships, and security frameworks.
By filling the leadership vacuum left by both Turkey’s retreat and Israel’s strategic vulnerabilities, Riyadh is strengthening its role as the dominant power in the Middle East. Moreover, as global powers seek a reliable and stable partner in the region, Saudi Arabia’s ability to balance economic leadership, strategic diplomacy, and security cooperation further solidifies its pursuit of regional dominance.
Saudi Arabia's rise aligns with Western and Israeli interests in curbing political Islam, reinforcing a regional order that prioritises stability over ideological movements, So IMEC " Indian-Middle-Eastern-Corridor" can passes peacefully without potential risks from Hamas or Hezbollah attacks, or political lobbying from Turkish or Iranian condemnations "Because they are not on the IMEC road"
