The most problematic refugee: Moscow’s refusal to extradite Bashar al-Assad

Image credits: Former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin are lighting a candle together. Photo courtesy Kremlin.

It became apparent after the visit of self-proclaimed transitional President Ahmad al-Sharaa to Moscow that the meeting was made possible by the new Syrian authority’s decision to exclude what Moscow considers a “non-negotiable” demand—the extradition of Bashar al-Assad. The Kremlin declined to comment on whether this issue was raised during the visit. What happened?

By Jaafar Khaddour
There is also an understanding that obtaining legitimacy now requires new foundations that move beyond the idea of the revolution and its old record. It also relies on Russia’s weight in the Security Council, which will discuss removing confident regime leaders from terrorism lists.

The extradition of Assad raises complex questions in which political considerations outweigh legal ones, though the latter should theoretically rule out the assumption of “extradition”—meaning judicial surrender. Despite the broad umbrella of humanitarian asylum, its motives are fundamentally political.

This does not necessarily prevent the criminal prosecution of a refugee if he is wanted for war crimes or crimes against humanity. In other words, if these international crimes have been committed and proven, the extradition request must be submitted to an international judicial body for trial, most notably the International Criminal Court (ICC), of which Russia is not a signatory.

This political reality takes precedence over the legal one, hindering judicial procedures and creating complex challenges.

In practice, the 1951 Refugee Convention (July 28) does not address extradition directly. However, it does provide significant legal barriers to it—particularly in Article 33, which prohibits the return or expulsion of a refugee “in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, or nationality.”

This means that the possibility of persecution or human rights violations serves as a decisive factor against return or expulsion. As a signatory to the Convention, Russia is bound by the principle of non-refoulement, which is a cornerstone of international law and custom.

Yet this right is not absolute; it can be overridden if the refugee commits a grave crime against the host society, and such an assessment remains within the host country's discretion as part of the balance between the refugee’s rights and duties.

An exception to the above rule applies to ongoing international crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, or non-political crimes) committed outside the host state and before the individual’s acceptance as a refugee.

Nevertheless, in theory, Russia could revoke Assad’s humanitarian asylum if the circumstances under which it was granted change, or if it is proven that the refugee poses a security threat to the host country—though the preference would be to protect his right not to face danger.

Although Russia refuses to extradite Assad, potential future prosecution could come from special international tribunals established for that purpose—though this possibility remains remote—or through bilateral extradition treaties between Russia, Syria, or a third party, should political conditions change drastically. However, no current indicators suggest that this will happen soon.

The only plausible scenario would be his extradition to the Syrian judiciary, which issued an arrest warrant against him on September 25 for non-international criminal charges, in accordance with the General Penal Code and the Anti-Torture Law No. 16 of 2022—provided that Russia agrees to it.

Ultimately, Moscow’s balance between legitimacy, politics, and law remains fraught with contradictions. Russia, seeking to reconcile its geopolitical calculations with its international legal position, recognises that the complexities of Syria’s foreign policy create a climate that can safeguard its interests amid multiple actors and major powers.

The real question is no longer whether Russia will extradite Assad, but at what price will Damascus remain silent about demanding it?

Jaafar Khdour is a human rights activist and political researcher. He holds a bachelor's degree in law from Damascus University and works in the multimedia industry. This is his first contribution to Liberum.

 

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