This article goes against the widely accepted view expressed by Ehud Yaari, an Israeli Journalist in The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, where he wrote: "Apart from the Syrian people themselves, Israel comes out of the 12 years of civil war in Syria as the biggest loser". The Syrian War was the final rehearsal for Israel to push Hezbollah to develop military capabilities that would not pose a significant future threat to it.

By Ahmad Ghosn
In his book (Hezbollah): The Story from Within, the group’s deputy secretary-general, Sheikh Naim Qassem, notes two strategic points that can threaten the party. He elaborates on internal strife with the Lebanese army and the weakening of Syria, which would isolate Hezbollah in Lebanon, cutting off its land route to Iran.

From that perspective, Hezbollah had no choice but to engage in the Syrian war, as its "Open Letter" to the “oppressed” in Lebanon and the world commits it to support all “oppressed” causes. It, therefore, viewed its involvement in Syria as fulfilling this role.

Nietzsche said: "When you fight with the same weapons as your enemies, you become like them." In the eight years Hezbollah fought in Syria, it began to resemble its adversaries, not in ideology but in capabilities.

Hezbollah faced the Free Syrian Army, Al-Nusra Front, and ISIS, whose most efficient weaponry was man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) and tanks captured from the Syrian army and their most significant military formations also lacked the structural organisation Hezbollah possessed.

Although Hezbollah had no idea how long the war would last, it became a strategic ally, ultimately tipping the balance of power in favour of the Syrian regime. In return, it ensured that attempts to sever its land connection with Syria — and, by extension, Iraq and Iran — failed.

Hezbollah gained experience in open-area combat with armoured formations, developing strengths that keep Israel from engaging Hezbollah directly and relying on airstrikes instead.

The qualitative gap between Hezbollah’s enemies in Syria and its traditional enemy, Israel, has created a crisis for the organisation today.

As Dr Adham Saouli told journalist Jad Ghosn: “Hezbollah prepared for an Israeli attack based on its expectations, much like Egypt did in 1967.”

The intelligence war
In Syria, Hezbollah made up 20 per cent of the combined forces with four other entities (the Iranian army, the Russian military, the Syrian army, and the Lijan militias), meaning it was eight times more vulnerable to breaches. According to Jusoor For Studies, Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have 469 locations around Syria, which makes them more vulnerable to breaches and surveillance.

Much of the opposition’s activity in Syria involved sabotage, including car bombs and suicide attacks, which forced Hezbollah to prioritise human intelligence (HUMINT) and open-source intelligence gathering.

This shift came at the expense of other intelligence sectors critical in a conflict with Israel, such as financial intelligence (FININT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), cyber intelligence (CYBINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).

What is Hezbollah doing today? It is hiding newly appointed figures, leaving Israeli intelligence uncertain about which part of the institution to target now.

The digital war
Human Rights Watch identified four digital tools used by the Israeli military in its operations. One tracks mobile phones to monitor movement during evacuations, while another, known as "The Bible," compiles lists of buildings or structural targets for attacks. A third, called "Lavender," classifies individuals based on their suspected affiliations with armed groups, determining whether they qualify as military targets. Finally, the tool "Where's Daddy?" identifies when a specific target is at a particular location.

In contrast, Hezbollah, according to the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, has a vast arsenal, including over 19 types of anti-tank missiles, both guided and unguided.

Among these are Russian-made Kornet laser-guided missiles and reverse-engineered Iranian versions of U.S. TOW missiles. Hezbollah also operates a limited air fleet of drones and a small naval fleet of light, fast attack boats.

It also possesses over 13 short-range air defence systems, including man-portable shoulder-fired missiles and anti-aircraft artillery. However, its medium- and long-range air defence capabilities remain limited.

Hezbollah’s opponents in Syria lacked advanced military, technological, and intelligence capabilities, so Hezbollah did not need to develop its advanced technical capabilities.

At that time, Hezbollah shifted to a horizontal rather than a vertical approach to development, prioritising quantity in military production over quality. This strategic mistake in its infrastructure occurred as its primary enemy shifted from Israel to the Syrian opposition forces and later to ISIS.

Reviewing Hezbollah’s literature reveals the group's important involvement in the region’s conflicts, especially the war. The group’s stance on security and intervention is summarised in Dr Hassan Fadlallah's book Hezbollah and the State in Lebanon: "Security is not confined to one country; we must expand to preserve it."

In addition, Ehud Yaari states in the same article: “The Israelis secretly maintained contacts with some of the more prominent rebel leaders in the southern Syrian provinces … Meetings were held in different locations along the border and the nearby Israeli city of Tiberias. Thus, attacks by rebels against Israel were averted, and some aid was extended to them.” - In this scenario, Israel protected itself. It started working in the Syrian depth without direct military intervention.

The proxy war Israel fought in Syria benefited both Israel and the Syrian regime. Israel was able to study Hezbollah on the battlefield without direct engagement, while the Syrian regime secured foreign allies to counter external interventions and retain power.

By drawing Hezbollah into an external conflict, Israel conducted a real-time study of the group, applying Sun Tzu’s advice from The Art of War: "Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient."

In the end, Hezbollah became distracted by a maze of victories in Syria, losing focus on its traditional enemy, Israel, for an extended period. Israel effectively trained Hezbollah for a war It will never fight.