China’s rise as a global power is no longer a distant prospect – it is happening now. While Russia’s grip over the post-Soviet space is weakening, and the United States remains preoccupied with its eternal struggles, Beijing is stepping in to fill the void, reshaping the Eurasian balance of power. But does this mean the era of Western dominance in the region, as well as in the rest of the world, is over?

By Nikola Mikovic
China and Russia have spent decades fostering a multipolar world order. Nevertheless, the international system remains heavily influenced by the United States and its European allies.

Paradoxically, it was US President Donald Trump who effectively encouraged China and India – widely seen as geopolitical rivals – to move toward normalising their relations. His tariffs on Indian goods, in response to New Delhi’s decision to continue purchasing Russian oil, have forced India to seek stronger partnerships with Beijing and other players in Eurasia.

As a result, on August 31, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China for the first time in over seven years. He joined Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and several other world leaders at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin.

Besides China, Russia, and India, the SCO – founded in 2001 – comprises Pakistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Belarus, with 16 more countries affiliated as observers or "dialogue partners". The presence of their leaders in Tianjin made the event the largest in the organisation’s history.

Following the summit, China and Armenia established a strategic partnership, while Azerbaijan received Beijing’s support in its ambitions to join the SCO. More importantly, Pakistan, which serves as Azerbaijan’s de facto ally, and India, which supports Armenia, appear to have found common ground by signing a joint SCO declaration acceptable to both Islamabad and New Delhi — a contrast to the group’s defence ministers’ meeting in June, when India refused to sign a joint statement, perceiving it as
“pro-Pakistan”.

The Tianjin declaration “strongly condemned” the April 22 terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir’s Pahalgam, as well as terror strikes inside Pakistan, including the Jaffer Express bombing and the Khuzdar attack on May 21. It also “strongly condemned” the military aggression against Iran by Israel and the United States in June 2025.

That, however, does not mean that the SCO – unlike many Western entities – functions as a bloc with precise ideological alignment. Its members often have diverse geopolitical interests. Reports suggest that, although both Armenia and Azerbaijan sought to join the group, Pakistan reportedly opposed Yerevan’s bid, while India blocked Baku’s.

Still, the summit undoubtedly allowed China to score diplomatic victories. It allowed other participants to develop closer economic and political ties—a chance not only with Beijing but also with one another.

Photos and videos of Xi, Putin, and Modi chatting and laughing quickly went viral. But what very few analysts noticed is that, before the summit, Putin and Modi met at the Ritz-Carlton while standing on a black-and-white checkered floor. Why did the Russian leader, widely seen as the West’s chief adversary, choose an American luxury establishment as his residence during the SCO summit? Why didn’t Putin – a proponent of traditional values – stay in a traditional Chinese house, instead?

The very fact that several Western hotel chains operate freely in Tianjin, as well as throughout China, clearly suggests that Beijing is not interested in limiting its economic ties with the West. The People’s Republic, as a dominant force in the SCO, does not hide its role in the organisation. Despite some of its leaders’ harsh rhetoric, it is not anti-Western, but rather a non-Western group.

As such, it does have the capacity to develop joint economic projects and strengthen political and military ties among its members, but it is unlikely to displace the West – particularly the United States – as the leading global power.

Trump and his team are almost certainly aware of that. Yet, for political purposes, he is sending a message to his own audience by accusing Russia, China, and North Korea of “conspiring against the United States.”

His statement was a reaction to another significant event held in China – the Victory Day Parade in Beijing, where Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un were among the major guests. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico was the only Western official who came to Beijing to attend the 80th anniversary of the Chinese victory over Japanese forces during World War II.

This move underscores the deepening geopolitical divide, while also highlighting Beijing’s strategy of strengthening ties with like-minded or strategically aligned states outside the traditional Western sphere of influence.

All that, however, does not imply that the “dragon-elephant-bear” triangle, as some analysts have labelled the alleged China-India-Russia alliance, poses an existential threat to the United States and its allies. The three nations, despite their current disagreements with the West, are geopolitical rivals that often use one another as counterweights to balance their ties with Washington.

Empires most often do not collapse solely due to external pressures or the rise of other powers, but because of internal weaknesses that make them vulnerable to collapse. The decline of the West will not result from the rise of China or any other external factor, but rather from weaknesses within that undermine its stability. Despite this being a long-term process, it is a scenario that is inevitable.