Elections in Belarus are far from uncertain. President Alexander Lukashenko, who has been in power since 1994, won yet another term. What awaits Eastern European countries amid the ongoing Ukraine war and growing political turbulence around the globe? 

By Nikola Mikovic
Predicting the outcome of the January 26 presidential election in Belarus was not particularly difficult. Very few people could even name Lukashenko’s primary rival. The 70-year-old strongman’s victory was never in question. According to the official results, he secured 87.6% of the votes in the Belarus presidential election, claiming another term in office. Sergei Syrankov, the first secretary of the Communist Party, received 2.7%, while all other candidates garnered less than 2% of the votes.

The European Union does not recognise the election results and Lukashenko’s legitimacy. Before the vote, Roberta Metsola, president of the European Parliament, wrote on X that “the time of dictatorship in Belarus will be over,” emphasising that “democracy will prevail.” Lukashenko, however, does not seem to be worried about the EU’s position.

“Whether the elections are recognised in the European Union is a matter of taste. Believe me, I don’t care. What matters is that the Belarusian people recognise the elections,” Lukashenko told reporters after casting his vote in Minsk.

For the Belarusian leader, what also matters is that Russia and China recognise his victory. Before the vote, he stated that he “simply would not have time to organise and control the election campaign,” as he was allegedly too busy preparing for a trip to the People’s Republic. On election day, he said that China has “everything Belarus needs for the development of its economy”, pointing out that Minsk’s geopolitical vector will continue to shift eastward.

Russia, rather than China, will undoubtedly remain Lukashenko’s principal ally. That, however, does not mean that the Belarusian leader will blindly follow orders he might get from the Kremlin. He will almost certainly seek to preserve significant autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow.

Despite being Russia’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Belarus, under Lukashenko, never intervened to protect Russia from Ukrainian missile and drone attacks. According to Article 4 of the CSTO Treaty, “an act of aggression (an armed attack that threatens security, stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty) against one of the member states will be considered a collective act of aggression on all member states of the CSTO”. Lukashenko, however, decided to ignore this document when Ukraine, in August 2024, occupied parts of Russia’s Kursk region.

Fully aware of his position, the Kremlin dared not demand that Belarus get directly involved in the Ukraine war. When Russia launched the full-scale invasion of the Eastern European country in February 2022, Lukashenko allowed Moscow to use Belarusian territory for the attack but refused to send Belarusian troops to fight in Ukraine. After Moscow suffered a series of debacles, it even stopped launching missile and drone attacks on Ukraine from Belarus.

Meanwhile, Lukashenko began to portray himself as a “peacemaker”, urging both Moscow and Kyiv to end the war. But the West is unlikely to ever forgive him for Belarus’ indirect participation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Over the past three years, the EU and the United States have imposed numerous sanctions on Minsk, though not as severe as those on Russia. Suppose the Ukraine war escalates, and Ukrainian troops eventually launch a cross-border operation into Belarusian territory. In that case, the West is expected to either openly support such an action or at least turn a blind eye.

The problem for Lukashenko is not the Western and Ukrainian approaches but the fact that significant parts of the Belarusian population do not see him as a legitimate leader. In the event of a potential Ukrainian attack, whether the Belarusian military would provide serious resistance or surrender is somewhat questionable.

Although the pro-Western opposition has been either jailed or exiled, it still represents the only alternative to Alexander Lukashenko. He has systematically eliminated all pro-Russian political forces in Belarus and is pursuing a soft form of “Belarusization” in the former Soviet republic. Thus, if Ukraine or NATO ever capture parts of the former Soviet republic, large segments of the Belarusian citizenry will likely welcome their troops as liberators.

More importantly, the fact that the United States did not give up on its ambitions to eventually overthrow Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, as well as the recent fall of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, clearly suggests that Lukashenko has reason to fear that Svetlana Tikhanovskaya—the exiled opposition leader—could play the same role in Belarus Abu Mohammed al-Jolani played in Syria.

However, such an outcome does not seem very probable at this point. In the long term, Lukashenko’s fate will likely depend on the result of the Ukraine war.

The Belarusian leader, however, seems to see the situation differently. In his view, the recent return to office of his US counterpart, Donald Trump, could create problems for Europe rather than Belarus.

“You face a tough future, Europe. With Trump’s return, the problems won’t be in Belarus, they will be in Europe,” he stressed.

The coming months and years will show whether he was right.