Iran's regional influence in the Middle East turns around ally Syria. In its struggle to be a regional player, Iran uses its proxies - Hezbollah (in Lebanon), Hamas (in Palestine), and the Houthis (in Yemen) - Syria stands apart as Iran’s only legitimate ally, offering access to the Mediterranean and anchoring its regional influence. Now that Syria has fallen, can Iran survive as a regional power? Or does it mark a decisive end to Iran’s regional force?

By Ahmad Ghosn
In a recent interview with CNN, Ahmad Al-Shar’a, or Al-Julani, Tahrir al-Sham leader, stated, "Some Arab countries tried to separate the regime from the Iranian vision, but I believe this is impossible. Even if the regime agrees, it cannot implement it. The regime's relationship with Iran has become organic. Iran can separate from the regime, but the regime cannot separate from Iran."

This statement challenges the view presented by al-Julani, proposing the ultimate opposite idea: Iran's relation with the Syrian regime is organic: Syria can separate from Iran, but Iran cannot separate from Syria."

Iran as a Regional Power
What defines a "regional power"? “A regional power is a state that projects influence in a specific region. The regional powers display comparatively high military, economic, political, and ideological capabilities, enabling them to shape their regional security agenda.”

In Regional Powers in the Middle East book, several key factors determine a state's "regionality," including its ability to lead based on resources (geographical, political, military, or economic), its political and security stability, its historical leadership record, and its symbolic influence (cultural and religious). The state's stance on major regional issues—such as the Palestinian cause, active resistance movements, and its relations with rising global powers like Russia and China.

A regional state is one whose geopolitical borders transcend its political borders; its influence and control extend beyond its geographical borders. Iran, as a regional state, helped establish Hezbollah in Lebanon, supported the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, influenced the Houthis in Yemen, supported Hamas in Palestine, and defended the regime in Syria. It has built influential external powers spanning five countries and two seas.

Iran in Lebanon
Following the Iranian revolution 1979, Iran sought to export its Islamic revolution across the region. The rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1982 provided Iran with an opportunity to expand its influence in both Lebanon and the wider Levant. With Hezbollah, Iran established a military foothold along the Mediterranean coast, close to Israel, positioning itself to strike at Israeli targets while remaining distant from the confrontation itself.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has openly stated that Iran finances, supplies, and trains the group. Estimates suggest that Hezbollah receives up to $700 million annually from Iran. Iran has played an active role in training Hezbollah fighters and leaders and has supported them in various conflicts, including the 2006 war with Israel and the Syrian Civil War. Iran has even helped Hezbollah develop cyber warfare capabilities.

The late Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah stated in one of his speeches: “Our project, which we have no choice but to adopt, as we are ideological believers, is the project of an Islamic state and the rule of Islam, and that Lebanon is not a single Islamic republic but rather part of the greater Islamic Republic, ruled by the Master of the Age and his deputy in truth, the Supreme Leader Imam Khomeini” In practice, the borders of Iranian influence begin in Mashhad and end in Naqoura.

However, Iran's involvement in Lebanon is considered "illegitimate" by many in the international community. Iran does not extend support to the Lebanese state, which the United Nations recognise, but instead backs Hezbollah, a non-state actor. While Hezbollah holds significant power, it cannot grant Iran legitimacy in its regional role.

Iran in Iraq
Iran shares a direct border with Iraq, making Iraq's security a matter of national interest. Following the success of the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war broke out in 1980, lasting eight years. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran seized the opportunity to strengthen its influence, training Shiite militias to fight U.S. and coalition forces.

Under orders from Tehran, the group established Unit 3800 in 2003 to train and assist Iraqi Shiite militias fighting against American and multinational forces. These militias, such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hezbollah, learned tactics from Hezbollah and carried out deadly attacks on U.S. troops. Following the rise of ISIS in 2014, Iran's Shiite militias became a critical part of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, which are now an integral part of the Iraqi state.

While Iran supports these militias, and some have been labelled terrorist organisations by certain countries, Iran’s actions in Iraq lack legitimacy. These militias are non-state actors, and the religious influence of Iran in cities like Najaf and Karbala does not provide Tehran with legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

Iran in Yemen
Iran has a strong relationship with the Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group that controls large portions of the country. The Houthis took over Yemen’s government in 2014, a move that was recognised only by Iran. The group is labelled a terrorist organisation by the United States and several other countries.

Iran supports the Houthis with money, weapons, and training, seeking to capitalise on Yemen's strategic location along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key global shipping route. However, the Houthis have not been recognised internationally, leaving Iran’s relationship with them outside the bounds of legitimacy.

Iran in Palestine
Iran has been a long-time supporter of Hamas, providing the Palestinian group with financial assistance, weapons, training, and intelligence. By supporting Hamas, Iran has been able to strike at Israel indirectly, using its proxies to launch attacks from both southern Lebanon and Syria.

The Wall Street Journal reported, citing a source within Hamas, that Iran was involved in planning the October 7 attack and that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps gave final approval for its execution during a meeting held in Beirut. Another report from the newspaper mentioned that hundreds of Hamas members and other Islamist fighters underwent specialised training in Iran weeks before the attack. Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, stated in an interview with Al Jazeera in 2022 that his movement receives $70 million annually from Iran.

Hamas, however, remains isolated in Gaza and is not recognised as a legitimate state actor. While Hamas has received substantial support from Iran, it cannot help Iran secure legitimacy in the broader region.

Iran and Syria
Iranian-Syrian relations underwent a drastic transformation after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which provided Syrian President Hafez al-Assad an opportunity to create a new balance against Israel and Iraq, Syria's regional rivals. On the other hand, the new Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, viewed Syria as a bridge to extend Iran’s influence into Lebanon. Mustafa Chamran, a close advisor to Khomeini, played a significant role in calling for an Iranian-Syrian alliance to strengthen their influence in southern Lebanon.

Hafez al-Assad was the first Arab president to recognise the Islamic Republic, established in February 1979.

Unlike its involvement in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Palestine, the Iranian-Syrian relationship is legitimate, as it is a relationship between two recognised states in the United Nations. This means that Iran’s access to the Mediterranean is only "legitimate" through Syria. Iran is strategically located in Syria, which shares borders with five countries, and from there, it influences the Middle East.

The fall of Syria would cut off Iran's access to the Mediterranean and disrupt the Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon-Palestine route. This is what Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has been warning about: "If Syria falls into the hands of the Americans, Israelis, Takfiris, and America’s regional tools, the so-called regional powers, the resistance will be surrounded" Therefore, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ali Khamenei, declared a jihad in favour of the Syrian government in September 2011, a decision primarily aimed at protecting Iran from suffocation.

Assad's fall came again in 2024, but this time, he had ample time to prepare for the battle -or even avoid it - but he didn’t help anyone help him. The fall of Syria, "the only legitimacy for Iran’s presence outside Iranian territory," would mark the end of Iran as a regional power, forcing it to retreat.