Although the cessation of armed hostilities is essential in ensuring that a ‘just’ peace is achieved, guaranteeing accountability for committing respective crimes and legal violations during a given conflict is indispensable. The Armenia-Azerbaijan case is a primary example of this, with the interests of the suffering side, in this case, Azerbaijan, not receiving enough worldwide attention and coverage.


By Farid Shafiyev and Huseyn Sultanli

The lack of attention derives from inadequate support, both from the aggressor and the broader international community, in the profoundly complex but morally vital process of restoring destroyed lands. This includes Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region and seven surrounding territories.

This is a crucial aspect of any post-conflict reconstruction process, without which everlasting peace will remain evasive. Therefore, it is essential to highlight why reaching peace does not always mean reaching ‘fair peace’, with recent dynamics in the Azerbaijan-Armenia relationship showing just that.

The necessity of international support

Members of the international community are obliged to participate in these processes not only because of moral responsibility. In the Azerbaijan-Armenia situation, Armenia’s irredentist and occupying policy was actually made possible and facilitated at large by the support and approval it received from ‘liberals’ in the West.

This was the case for several reasons, including religious ones but also those that were fabricated in support of false ideological premises, targeted to justify and turn a blind eye to Armenia’s hostile actions.

Moreover, in addition to bolstering Armenia, certain members of the Western community went as far as vilifying Azerbaijan for a situation it was in no way responsible for. Despite their international recognition as a part of Azerbaijan, Armenia proceeded to occupy Azerbaijani lands and deliberately target Azerbaijani nationals, a policy carried out systematically and which resulted in horrific incidents such as the Khojaly genocide of February 1992.

The destruction of cities like Aghdam and the removal of Azerbaijani nationals from their lands are actions that necessitate genuine accountability for all those responsible, something that becomes impossible if external actors decide to ignore the reality of the conflict.

Despite this, Azerbaijan is regularly accused of ‘not wanting’ peace and even jeopardising talks, a baseless claim made by actors that provide comprehensive support to Armenia and fuel anti-Azerbaijan rhetoric and sentiment in their own countries.

Despite consistent calls from Azerbaijan for a partial and regional solution for achieving long-term peace, persistent and one-sided intervention in regional processes from specific actors has consistently undermined progress in the negotiation track. Most importantly, some of the support directed towards Armenia’s supposed ‘rearmament’ is specifically dangerous because of the direct impact it has on boosting already existing ‘revanchist’ sentiments in the country against Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan – the ‘peace wanting’ party

Azerbaijan has undoubtedly been the more active and ambitious side in the negotiations, with steps like the five-point peace proposal in February 2022 adhering to all principles of international law and moral righteousness.

The plan suggested that the following was needed to make the signing of a peace treaty achievable: mutual recognition of each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual confirmation that no territorial claims exist against each other and that no such claims will arise in the future; refraining from threatening each other through force or other means; setting borders and establishing diplomatic relations; opening transportation and communication lines, facilitating cooperation on mutual areas of interest.

This process generated some momentum, with interventions from then-European Council President Charles Michel leading to three meetings between the respective leaders.

A priori, Armenia appeared ready to recognise Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, but these signals were far from the formal and official recognition needed to eliminate remaining barriers to peace. On-going peace negotiations continue along three key tracks, with one of the primary areas of concern being the territorial claims in the Armenian constitution that facilitate the potential future resumption of attacks against sovereign Azerbaijani territory.

Although the Armenian side has finally signalled its readiness to adopt the crucial change and also reject, via the dismantling of the Minsk Group, the role of foreign actors in the official peace process, there is considerable scope for further dialogue on issues such as border demarcation and delimitation but also the opening of transport links.

This factor particularly undermines Armenia’s approach to the diplomatic track, largely because of its reluctance to comply with the terms of the trilateral statement signed between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. According to this document, Armenia agreed to guarantee Azerbaijan, like Iran, “unhindered” passage to Nakhchivan.

‘Guaranteeing’ peace – the ‘dividends’ issue
Apart from fulfilling vital obligations in the short term, achieving peace requires considerable long-term investments that will ensure stability and security. Armenia must demonstrate a consistent willingness to ‘correct its wrongs’ vis-à-vis Azerbaijan and its population.

This process, however, is considerably more complicated and long-winded than just satisfying specific agreements or modifying one’s long-standing position on a particular matter (i.e. the constitution question). The achievement of long-term peace, especially about such a violent, decade-long conflict consisting of occupation and displacement of, in total, over a million people.

It requires compensation for the damage incurred and external assistance, which, at minimum, ensures that all parties benefit equally from peace. As mentioned, ‘fast-track’ peace risks leaving the foundations of the conflict unsolved or simply sidelining them in exchange for short-term political gain.

This is when the rarely discussed and often overlooked issue of ‘dividends of peace’ becomes pertinent. As things stand, it is unclear the extent to which Azerbaijan would benefit from ‘immediate’ peace. The country’s leadership has repeatedly highlighted that peace is in the country’s national interest.

However, before peace becomes official, certain commitments must be fulfilled, ensuring peace is not signed just to get a long and tedious process ‘over the line’. In the current context, however, Azerbaijan finds itself extremely solitary. The country is pursuing an independent but comprehensive restoration policy that seeks to undo decades of damage to its territory.

This involves the Azerbaijani government’s significant investments in transforming Karabakh into an economically attractive region and other initiatives such as the relocation program for displaced Azerbaijanis. Except for the country’s closest allies, among which is Turkey, the broader “international community” is once again demonstrating profound apathy in supporting Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

This reality is exacerbated by the fact that in other instances, such as in the Russia-Ukraine war, countries underpin the transatlantic alliance are adamant about the need for multifaceted support for Ukraine that guarantees its present-day and long-term security.

The ‘selective’ quest for peace
However, this same policy is difficult to observe in Azerbaijan. In fact, and somewhat astonishingly, specific members of Western institutions are hindering the peace process by directing excessive support to Armenia.

This is not just regular symbolic support signalling mutual recognition of ties—it is support targeted at minimising Azerbaijan’s regional position, complicating the official peace track, and crucially, preventing Armenia’s acceptance of its wrongdoings and countering Yerevan’s (albeit partial) desire to move forward in a new direction. Organisations like the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) are among such initiatives.

The actual goal of the mission remains unclear. It generates a lot of scepticism and concern in Azerbaijan, primarily because of the well-known role of France in the organisation, the country with the deepest anti-Azerbaijan sentiments. The European Peace Facility, not mentioning the military support from Washington during the Biden administration, is encouraging reform of the Armenian military. This initiative will likely result in further tension along the border with Azerbaijan. Deepening military cooperation with countries like India is undoubtedly the consequence of a desire to re-arm and overcome the key military defeat inflicted by Azerbaijan.

In contrast, despite being a reliable European Union partner in the energy sphere, where the organization benefits from Azerbaijani natural resources, assistance is provided to Azerbaijan minimally. The difference in attention is overwhelming, whereas the grounds for such a difference are non-existent.

Previous examples of post-conflict peace negotiations magnify this point further. One such example is the Camp David Accords, signed in September 1978 and subsequently leading to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel the following year. The accords were mediated by the US, which hosted the meeting after decades of non-existent relations between the two countries, marked by war and the broader absence of relations between Israel and the Arab world.

The talks concluded with several key outcomes, including developing a landmark framework that set the scene for the later conclusion of peace between the two countries.

As a consequence of the talks, Israel withdrew its armed forces from the Sinai Peninsula, left four air bases that it had constructed in the country since the 1967 ‘Six-Day War’ and developed security guarantees in the face of Egypt being unable to deploy its soldiers ‘within a strip of 20-40 kilometres’ along the border without prior Israeli approval.

Many claim these negotiations were highly complex, lasting 13 days, and not benefitting from much optimism in their preview. It was, however, America’s diplomatic assistance to both sides, and particularly Jimmy Carter’s role in managing two leaders with contrasting styles, that turned the tide.

Another example is the work carried out by the first Trump administration on the Abraham Accords, where the president’s initiative to bring leaders together launched a milestone peace track in the Middle East. Donald Trump was able to propose incentives for mutual understanding between the leaders of Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain.

Despite existing differences, the countries began exchanging ideas and cooperating on ‘shared’ initiatives in various spheres, including defence issues. This logically brought important individual benefits for all the sides involved.

Therefore, the normalisation of ties was once again made possible by the political will of the leader of a larger and more influential nation. This might appear straightforward but once again emphasises the indispensability of well-intentioned mediation.

Similar examples from the Azerbaijan-Armenia process are nowhere to be found. Individual leaders from Western Europe or even specific administrations have been unable to set an example and demonstrate diplomatic coherence by facilitating rather than impeding peace.

Many found it difficult to process and accept Azerbaijan’s comprehensive victory in the Second Karabakh War. More gravely, however, they failed to acknowledge that Azerbaijan’s military activity (both in 2020 and 2023) to dismantle separatist organisations on its sovereign territory originated from adherence to international law and respect for fundamental principles of the UN Charter.

‘Rapid’ peace does not mean ‘genuine’ peace.
It would be inaccurate to suggest that a party that has suffered from conflict does not ‘require’ peace, especially given Azerbaijan’s intense work on the diplomatic track. However, the Israel-Egypt case benefited from conditions favourable to peace, with the United States determined to inaugurate a new chapter for Israelis in its relations with the Arab world by first facilitating the reaching of peace with Egypt.

Most importantly, progress was achieved by complying with each side's respective demands. Land was swiftly returned to Egypt, whereas Israel bolstered its security by minimising the threat coming from its border with Egypt.

In the Azerbaijan-Armenia case, the reality could not be more different. Despite consistently siding with international law, upholding the UN’s charter and its respective resolution, and advocating for multilateralism, Azerbaijan continues to face inexplicable criticism from Western European capitals that dominate the European political arena.

Conversely, Armenia paradoxically contradicts Western objectives vis-à-vis the South Caucasus – trade between Russia and Armenia has increased considerably in the last few years, reducing the impact of the sanctions program Washington and Brussels have led.

For these reasons, the ‘rapid peace’ benefits for Azerbaijan are unclear. The country is firm in its position that fundamental obligations preventing the resumption of irredentist actions by Armenia must be fulfilled before peace is reached. As with all of its foreign policy issues, Azerbaijan is confident in its foreign policy's ability to yield outcomes aligned with its national strategy.

Nevertheless, the current ‘contributions’ of external actors and the dangers associated with them have seriously led Baku to question whether ‘peace at all costs’, which is superficial and impermanent, is actually beneficial for the country and region more broadly. If ‘real peace’ is the mutual objective, the dividends from peace must be equal, a reality that at the present moment seems insurmountable.

Farid Shafiyev, Chairman of the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)

Huseyn Sultanli, Media Specialist at the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)