Since 1978, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) under its leader Abdullah Ocalan had been operating in Turkey with a separatist Kurdish state, and later, from the 1990s, increased autonomy, cultural, and political rights. Having engaged in clashes since 1979 and full-armed insurgency against the Turkish state from 1984, engaging in asymmetric warfare, with 40,000 casualties, despite Ocalan's imprisonment since 1999.
By Ahsan Ali
With mainly operating from Northern Iraq and Southeastern Turkey, the regional implications felt across the equilibrium are masked by different Kurdish separatist movements under the rug. In 2007, Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) was formed by serving and former PKK members to unite Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian Kurds under one umbrella, which further intensified Turkish operations against PKK military activities.
With various peace processes between the PKK and the Turkish state, first initiated in 2013 but ultimately breaking down in 2015, and then resumed in 2024. The 2024 negotiations resulted in Abdullah Ocalan announcing a ceasefire on 1st March 2025, the formal end of war, and disbanding the group by 12th May 2025, which resulted in the 11th July burning down of weapons at a cauldron in Suleymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan.
The armed struggle has been declared over, with a transition to democratic principles for the Kurds, supported by various political parties, including the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party and Devlet Bahçeli, a nationalist ally of President Erdoğan. The end of the armed struggle has led to changes in the regions, as the security and balance of power in the Middle East and Anatolia have shifted.
The conflict between PKK and state security has taken on the toll of 15,000 casualties within Iraq and Syria, with aspirations of similar Kurdish militant ambitions in Syria and Iraq, alongside political activities in Iran. With PKK driving the separatist ideology, its offshoots' activities within Iraq and Syria are perceived as a threat to territorial integrity and dominance.
The demise of PKK happened at a crucial time, specifically with the recent fall of Assad, rise of Turkish-sponsored group of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with widespread geopolitical implications of SDF signing agreement on 10th March 2025. With America's aid withdrawal, Turkish-backed group military strikes, and geopolitical shift pressure on security, SDF (YPG) came under political and military pressure to integrate Rojava and other SDF-controlled areas.
Where PKK was taking its fight from Southeastern Turkey and Northern Iraq, the primary military wing of SDF was facing difficulties and pressures in Syria to maintain the conflict between the two. It further bolstered Turkey's position in Damascus under its new government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, marking a significant turning point for Ankara's stance in the Middle East and its regional ambitions.
The fall of PKK will also increase Turkish influence within Iraq, with the potential of new energy deals between Turkey and Iraq, alongside increasing military cooperation between the two. Where Iraqi Kurdistan was observed as an inspiration by Kurds in the region, the settling of PKK in the mountains will lead to fire being extinguished in Rojava, Southeastern Turkey and Iran. Turkey has indirectly allowed Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad jurisdiction to be controlled more within Iraq, where it was unable to tackle the PKK.
Meanwhile, internally, President Erdogan has gained popularity through Syrian refugees' return and role in Damascus power change, YPG institutional and structural assimilation in the new Syrian system, and PKK demise, which have further bolstered his position and allowed peace in Turkey. This has also led to a decline in Russian influence in the region, allowing Turkey to rise as a new actor in the Middle East, particularly with its close relations with the Turkic world, and in peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, with the US' blessing.
This will potentially allow him to run for one more election through a constitutional change or by having his backed candidate run in the polls. Where Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu's arrest raised concerns on Turkish democracy and Erdogan's role in the state, PKK's demise may potentially cover Imamoglu's arrest.
Erdogan is potentially credited with bringing a potential permanent end to the PKK's fight against the state. Syrian refugees' return might further contribute to resuscitating Erdogan's popularity, as Arab and foreign investments have been directed with the lifting of sanctions by the US.
Externally, Iran and other regional actors constantly challenged Turkish influence. Still, with Iran out of the paradox, Turkey will fill the power and security vacuum, especially in Syria and Northern Iraq. Meanwhile, where Russian influence has diminished, the US may allow Turkish influence to be established in a delicate and balanced manner, thereby preventing Iran and Russia from reasserting their influence in the region.
