Europe must now become a geopolitical power, manage without the US, and dare to provoke Russia, wrote the former editor-in-chief of a leading Dutch newspaper. Arguing that the European Union must become a genuine military power: ‘The world has become a different place’. An opinion you hear and read increasingly often. An unrealistic proposition from a military perspective, and it puts the current American presence in Europe at risk.

By Anton van Schijndel
Several questions arise: was the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall (the collapse of the Soviet Union) not a unique event in world history? Are we now back to a global stage as it has existed for millennia? Can the European Union ever act as a great power, given its institutional structure and very diverse composition? Would it not be better, then, to take a moment to think before we dismiss our American friends?

To assess the above-mentioned propositions, it is useful to consult two well-known theories of international relations. The first emphasises the development of a liberal international order after the Second World War; it has long predominated in the Netherlands. The other approach is known as the doctrine of the balance of power; this is particularly prevalent outside Western Europe, including in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing.

The Netherlands has traditionally been committed to a rules-based international order. Since 1953, the Constitution has stipulated that the Netherlands promotes this, understandable for a small country with limited military capabilities.

Thus, after the Second World War, the Netherlands focused on cooperation within organisations such as the United Nations, NATO, and the European Economic Community (EEC). Institutional cooperation within fixed frameworks of international law was a matter of course for The Hague.

And indeed, after the fall of the Wall, the Dutch vision gained momentum; the United States was then the only remaining great power. For example, in the 1990s, Americans advocated for greater international cooperation by admitting communist China to the World Trade Organisation (in 2001) and for international climate policy (the Paris Agreement).

But treaty texts are patient. The alternative doctrine of the balance of power currently predominates. The Netherlands must inevitably relate to this. With approximately two and a half millennia, this theory has a venerable history. Thucydides wrote about it in his book on the Peloponnesian War between the great powers of the time, Athens and Sparta.

This theory hinges on the structural characteristics of state systems. Those characteristics are (and remain): the anarchy within the system, leaving each country to fend for itself in terms of survival (self-help); the number of great powers; and the geographical location of great powers and their neighbouring countries. There are currently three great powers in the world: the United States, Russia, and China.

Neighbouring countries of a major power can defend themselves by becoming allies of another major power. For instance, the city-state of Thebes joined Sparta to prevent conquest by neighbouring Athens. Sweden and Finland did the same after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They joined NATO, effectively aligning with the United States.

Hungary is a mirror image. Based on a calculation of the pros and cons, Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán occasionally opposes the desire of most EU countries and the European Commission to support Ukraine financially and militarily. It has always been the case that major powers view their geographical surroundings as legitimate spheres of influence.

An example is the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro. The White House now also has Cuba in its sights – due to the blockade of Venezuelan oil supplies, it appears the regime is on the verge of collapse (Financial Times, March 28). And who knows if, after a sudden ceasefire with Iran declared by Trump, he will win the midterms with Cuba as a trophy.

Back to the straightforward roadmap of international law. A country can—without permission from the UN Security Council—launch an attack on a neighbouring country only if an attack is imminent —that is, if there is an acute danger; only then is there the imminent threat required by international law.

But in the case of Iran, we run up against the fact that an existential threat can also develop over a much longer period. Iran has been working on nuclear weapons and the means of delivery for them for decades; it cannot be predicted when these systems will be ready for use. International law offers no solace here.

To nip that threat in the bud, there is only an appeal to the doctrine of the balance of power, combined with the fact that it is completely intolerable to allow one's own population to live permanently under the threat of, at some point, nuclear annihilation. In an interview in the Financieele Dagblad (March 28), the former UN envoy for Gaza, Sigrid Kaag, states the same.

To a certain extent, the same applies to the war in Ukraine. In 2008, at a summit in Bucharest, NATO pledged to admit the country ‘in due course’. In the Association Agreement of 2014, Ukraine was promised membership in the European Union.

Russia viewed and continues to view this as a major danger: NATO advancing to the gates of Moscow. With the invasion of Ukraine, it is attempting to nip this in the bud, given the losses over the past four years, at an enormous cost.

But the European Union is and remains a patchwork. The European Commission and foreign policy commentators may view Europe as an economic and moral superpower regarding matters such as climate, human rights, the rule of law, privacy, and so on. But that is the self-image of European policymakers, not of the continent's inhabitants.

It is clear that when push comes to shove, most Europeans are not convinced of the necessity of investing heavily in defence. In any case, that readiness for defence is quite skewed. It runs from East to West: the Baltic states and Poland already spend around 5% of their GDP on defence, followed by the Scandinavian countries, Germany, and the United Kingdom, but from Belgium and further south, little comes of it.

The Netherlands wants to elevate the 5% to law, but perhaps it is advisable to take a moment to think about this as well. In any case, anyone who carefully considers Washington's recent course sees new priorities rather than a fundamental break. Since Obama, the emphasis there has shifted to strategic competition with China. So, no foreign adventures (Obama: ‘My foreign policy: Don’t do stupid things’).

Trump made an exception for Iran; we will have to wait and see how that plays out. Crucially, the EU is too diverse to act on foreign and military matters at a moment's notice. So there is little choice but to appease our American friends to maintain their significant military presence in Europe. And for Trump, the president-dealmaker, this principle applies: quid pro quo.

Anton van Schijndel is a Dutch politician and jurist, born in Amsterdam in 1960. He holds a master's in security studies from Columbia University. studied Security. He previously served in the House of Representatives for the VVD (2005–2006) before joining FvD. Beyond politics, he is an experienced corporate lawyer. His previous contribution can be read here.