Most people assume the Western world is intent on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. This belief underpins the ongoing missile exchanges and proxy wars between Israel and Iran, to dismantle Iran’s nuclear capabilities by any means necessary. But this assumption may be misguided. The reality is likely more strategic than security-driven:
By Ali Albeash
Iran possessing a nuclear weapon may not be of great military concern to the West—after all, countries like Pakistan and North Korea, both adversarial and unstable in their own right, already possess them.
What truly differentiates Iran is not the nuclear weapon itself, but the nature of its regime. A nuclear-armed clerical government would be far harder to topple, and regime change—a long-standing objective for some Western and regional powers—would become nearly impossible. In this light, the West’s fixation on the Iranian nuclear program appears less about non-proliferation and more about preserving the option for future intervention.
On April 12th, 2025, Iran-U.S. peace talks resumed under the pretence that U.S. President Donald Trump was more interested in negotiation than confrontation. Trump presented Ayatollah Ali Khamenei with a maximalist list of demands: dismantle the nuclear program, eliminate enriched uranium stockpiles, and allow unfettered access for international inspectors. These terms, politically suicidal for any Iranian leader, were delivered with characteristic bluntness. When Khamenei didn’t immediately acquiesce, Trump publicly mocked the delay.
Two months later, on June 13, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—disillusioned with the peace talks and declaring any resulting deal irrelevant to Israel—launched Operation Rising Lion. The first wave of strikes targeted top-tier Iranian officials—around 40 figures across the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the leadership of the nuclear program. Subsequent waves struck atomic facilities, despite Pentagon assessments that even a large-scale attack would not fully dismantle Iran’s capabilities.
The operation expanded quickly. Israel began targeting infrastructure: ports, fuel reserves, ballistic missile sites, government facilities, and, increasingly, vital economic and energy infrastructure. This escalation suggests a broader strategy: rather than merely neutralising a nuclear threat, Israel appears intent on cornering the regime, pushing it toward collapse through sustained, precise military and psychological pressure.
Netanyahu’s rhetoric underscores this intention. He consistently distinguishes between the Iranian regime and the Iranian people, urging civilians to distance themselves from their “oppressors.” In parallel, Kurdish factions such as the PJAK have seized the moment to call for civil resistance. It feels increasingly as though a coordinated effort is underway to write the final chapter in the Islamic Republic’s history.
Israeli military analysts estimate that the campaign could last one to three weeks. Meanwhile, Trump’s silence is telling. While allowing Netanyahu to claim a national-security victory and delay any internal political fallout, Trump is positioning U.S. B-52 bombers to finish the job, striking whatever nuclear infrastructure remains, and thus forcing Khamenei into accepting terms that could precipitate regime collapse within months.
If these pressures fail, assassination remains on the table. Netanyahu has repeatedly refused to rule out a targeted killing of Khamenei. Were such an event to occur, the impact could be seismic. The death of the Supreme Leader would send shockwaves through Iran, potentially triggering revolts by long-oppressed groups: the PJAK Kurds, the Balochis, the reformists, and even monarchist sympathisers.
Sceptics argue that the IRGC would never allow such a transition and would plunge the country into civil war before ceding power. Yet this assumes the Guard remains loyal. Following the U.S. assassination of Qassem Soleimani in 2020 and subsequent high-profile killings, there have been persistent reports of internal fractures within the regime. Some of the intelligence leaks that enabled these operations allegedly originated within the IRGC itself. If the revolutionary institution turns on the clerical leadership, the first defectors may well be the revolutionaries.
Amid this backdrop, Reza Pahlavi—the exiled son of the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi—has emerged as a key figure in the discourse on post-regime Iran. For the past three years, he has spoken at international forums across Geneva, Munich, London, Oxford, and the United States, advocating a non-violent, democratic transition. His Iran Prosperity Project (IPP) proposes a concrete roadmap for economic recovery and regional reintegration. Strategically, it would restore Iran as a Western-aligned power on China’s doorstep—precisely the geopolitical outcome Trump seeks.
Such a shift would not go unanswered by Beijing. China may respond by challenging U.S. military dominance in the Pacific, perhaps even invading Taiwan to disrupt the global semiconductor supply chain. Alternatively, Washington could quietly offer Taiwan as a bargaining chip, securing Middle Eastern mineral wealth critical for restarting a U.S.-led chip industry and ending China’s leverage over American technology.
In 2021, Fereydoon Abbasi, the former head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation, stated that Iran could build a nuclear weapon as far back as 2006, but chose not to—citing a religious fatwa issued by Khamenei. Regardless, Iran’s nuclear arsenal would pose no more of a threat to Israel than Russia’s does to France. The principle of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) would apply just as forcefully. Thus, the nuclear issue serves more as a geopolitical tool than a genuine existential threat.
The fall of Iran’s clerical regime would mark the end of an era. With Trump and Netanyahu alternating roles—pressure and provocation—it seems the plan is already in motion. When the collapse comes, a new Middle East will be born.
