Almost two and a half years after Tehran began supplying Moscow with Shahed drones, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Pezeshkian, signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Now, it remains to be seen who will betray whom first.

By Nikola Mikovic
Russia and Iran have a history of abandoning their close allies, which should pause us when considering their current partnership. Nowhere is that more evident than in Syria, where both Moscow and Tehran allowed Turkey-backed rebels to overthrow their client, Bashar al-Assad.

Previously, the Islamic Republic turned a blind eye while Israel killed Hezbollah’s political and military leadership. As a result, the Shia group suffered a humiliating defeat, and Tehran lost its “land bridge” in the Levant. The only proxy it can still use against Israel is the Houthi movement, officially the Ansar Allah, in Yemen.

Moscow, on the other hand, did nothing to help its ally Armenia in 2020 when it was fighting a war against Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Consequently, Yerevan is now actively developing close political and military relations with the West, while Russia lost much of its influence in the strategically vital South Caucasus region.

More importantly, as the Ukraine war drags on and Kyiv attacks Russian territory daily, it becomes clear that none of Moscow’s allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) are willing to help Russia. Fully aware, the Kremlin signed the defence cooperation pact with North Korea in early November 2024.

Two months later, on January 17, 2025, Russia and Iran inked a similar deal. According to the Iranian–Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, “if either country faces aggression, the other agrees not to assist the aggressor.” This is a much weaker formulation than the accord signed by Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, which called on each side to “come to the other's aid in case of an armed attack.”

Although Russia and Iran agreed to strengthen cooperation in security and defence, they seem to be paying more attention to energy ties. Moscow and Tehran, according to reports, plan to build a gas pipeline linking the two nations via Azerbaijan. Once completed, Russia will supply up to 2 billion cubic meters of pipeline gas to Iran and may increase the volumes to 55 billion cubic meters per year.

However, the problem for the Kremlin and the Islamic Republic is that they will heavily depend on Azerbaijan as a transit country. Baku, having close ties with Israel and NATO-member Turkey, will be in a position to halt gas supplies through Azerbaijani territory if hostilities between Iran and the Jewish State escalate.  

Moscow and Tehran will constantly be forced to make significant concessions to Azerbaijan, further strengthening the South Caucasus nation’s role as a regional power.

Despite that, Russia and Iran reportedly aim to include Azerbaijan in constructing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which would consist of sea routes, rail links, and roads connecting Mumbai in India to Saint Petersburg in Russia.

Although the INSTC sea route runs from northern Russia across the Caspian Sea to southern Iran, its land route connects Russia and Iran through Azerbaijan, which could further cement Baku's leverage over both Moscow and Tehran, significantly altering the regional power dynamics.

Armenia could quickly become the first “victim” of the Russian-Iranian partnership. In the event of a potential new war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia is unlikely to interfere and protect its nominal ally, which continues to distance itself from the Kremlin.

Iran, for its part, is well aware that any military action against Azerbaijan will have serious consequences for the very future of the Islamic Republic. That is why Iranian intervention on behalf of Armenia does not seem very probable, potentially destabilising the region.

Finally, the fact that the Kremlin and the Islamic Republic have demonstrated that they are not willing to protect their allies and proxies suggests that they are unlikely to be ready to defend each other. Tehran has repeatedly stated that it does not intend to recognise Moscow’s annexation of five Ukrainian regions. At the same time, the Kremlin looked the other way every time Israel attacked the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps positions in Syria.

Given that Russia has historically used Iran as a counterweight or source of leverage to balance its relations with its Western powers – which is something Tehran is trying to do now – there is no guarantee that the Kremlin and the Islamic Republic will seriously help each other if attacked.

Thus, despite harsh rhetoric, the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership does not appear to threaten the two nations’ opponents seriously. Nevertheless, the political leaderships in Moscow and Tehran can use the agreement to create the illusion that their audiences are not alone in their struggle against the West. However, this alliance could shift the balance of power in the Middle East and Central Asia, posing new challenges for Western powers.