The Israeli-American attack on the Islamic Republic has clearly shown that Iran is on its own in the international arena, and that it will be very hard for a nation of 90 million people to find any allies. Following Bashar al-Assad’s fall in Syria and Hezbollah’s defeat in 2024, the Tehran-backed Axis of Resistance is no longer what it once was.

By Nikola Mikovic
“This world order always was, is, and will be, an ever-living fire, kindled in measures and extinguished in measures”, an ancient Greek pre-Socratic philosopher, Heraclitus, wrote some 2500 years ago. Indeed, on June 24, Israel, the United States, and Iran have (at least temporarily) ended their conflict, almost as if on someone's command.

US President Donald Trump can now, once again, focus on the war in Ukraine, while Israel and Iran will undoubtedly begin preparing for another round of confrontation. The Jewish State will likely seek to improve its air defence capabilities and acquire more sophisticated weapons. The Islamic Republic, on the other hand, will face significant challenges in rebuilding the military infrastructure that Israel has destroyed.

Another problem for Tehran is that it cannot count on Russia’s – Iran’s strategic partner – support. Preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, Moscow is not in a position to assist the Islamic Republic, even if it wanted to.

The Kremlin has historically used Iran as a counterweight or source of leverage to balance its relations with the West. Despite nominally having the same opponent – the United States – Moscow never provided Iran with sophisticated weapons.

After the 2007 UN Security Council embargo on conventional arms shipments to Iran expired in October 2020, Tehran has reportedly shown interest in purchasing Su-35 fighter jets, Yak-130 training jets, T-90 tanks, the advanced S-400 surface-to-air missile defence system, or the K-300P Bastion mobile coastal defence missile system from Russia.

Is Russia an ally of Israel?
The very fact that Israel managed to establish air superiority over Iran easily clearly indicates that the Kremlin never sold any air defence systems to its strategic partner. More importantly, it became clear back in April that Moscow does not intend to side with the Islamic Republic against the United States.

“If the United States attacks Iran, Russia is not obligated to provide military assistance under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with Iran,” said Andrei Rudenko, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister.

Verbally, the Kremlin condemned Israel’s actions against the Islamic Republic, while in reality, it did nothing to change the balance of power. Such an approach drew criticism not only in Iran but in Russia as well, which is why Russian President Vladimir Putin reacted, calling those who considered Russia an unreliable ally of Iran “provocateurs.”

Moscow’s position is nothing new. Russia has a history of turning a blind eye while Israel was bombing Iran-backed militias operating in Syria during Assad’s reign. It was, therefore, no surprise when Iran in 2017 accused Russia of providing the codes for Syria's anti-aircraft missiles to Israel.

Also, Nikolai Patrushev, the head of Russia’s National Security Council, openly said in 2019 that the Kremlin put special attention on ensuring Israel’s security. Such actions by Moscow raise a key question: does Russia act like Iran’s strategic partner, or like a de facto ally of Israel?

Although Tehran can unlikely count on Moscow’s support against Israel and the United States, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi travelled to Moscow on June 23 to meet with Putin. His visit to the Russian capital came one day after the United States joined Israeli attacks on the Islamic Republic.

Coincidentally or not, the US launched its bombing campaign against Iran on June 22, at 4 AM – the anniversary of Germany's 1941 Operation Barbarossa attack on the Soviet Union.

Tehran’s initial response to Washington’s move was a warning that it “reserves the right to defend its sovereignty.” It is the same rhetoric the Kremlin has used for years in its dealings with Ukraine and the West. Still, on June 23, Iran responded by striking American military bases in Qatar.

However, in such a way that no US soldiers were killed or wounded, and no damage was done to the facilities. It was, therefore, another Kremlin-style PR stunt of a “response” that some in Iran celebrated as a “great victory.”

There are, indeed, many similarities between Russia’s and Tehran’s approach to the wars they are involved in. When Iranian Revolutionary Guard senior commander General Mohsen Rezaei recently claimed that the Islamic Republic has “deployed only 30 percent of its current military capabilities and just five percent of its total potential in the ongoing conflict with Israel, it was strongly reminiscent of Putin’s July 2022 assertion that Russia had “barely started its military action in Ukraine.”

Moreover, Russian missile strikes on Ukraine have proven mainly ineffective. They might have done significant harm to the Ukrainian civilian population, but not to the Eastern European nation’s armed forces. The same applies to Iran, whose strikes on Israel caused no significant damage to the Jewish state's military, as Israeli troops continued bombing Tehran and other Iranian cities daily.

Russia and Israel: Key differences.
While, from the perspective of international law, both Russia and Israel are engaged in aggression against sovereign states, there are significant differences in how the two nations are conducting their military operations. Israeli aviation bombed Iranian targets without losses and has complete air superiority. Russian aviation, on the other hand, has lost a large number of aircraft since 2022.

In just one week, Israel has killed dozens of top Iranian military and political figures. At the same time, Putin openly promised former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett that he would not kill his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky. To this day, Russia has not assassinated any top Ukrainian military or political official.

According to reports, Israeli air defences successfully repelled hundreds of Iranian missiles, with only a few reaching their targets. In contrast, Russian air defences are far less effective, as Ukraine continues striking Russian military infrastructure, inflicting severe losses. Israel has also hit Iranian TV channels, aiming to neutralise its opponent’s propaganda, while Ukrainian media continue operating freely, without any fear of Russian attacks.

At the same time, Israeli intelligence agencies operate in Iran as if they were on home turf, while there is no evidence of any activity by Russian special services in Ukraine. Still, perhaps the most significant difference is that Israel has no business dealings with Iran. In contrast, Russia has been paying Ukraine $1 billion in transit fees for natural gas, effectively helping its adversary fund its budget.

Thus, despite having strong ties with Israel – including the fact that some Russian oligarchs hold Israeli citizenship – Russia’s and Israel’s approaches to war are fundamentally different. From this perspective, Moscow appears much closer to Tehran, suggesting that the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic may ultimately share the same fate: defeat.

That, however, is unlikely to happen shortly. Both Russia and Iran can continue fighting, although not as effectively as their opponents. But unless they implement structural changes in their political and economic systems, their chances of prevailing are minimal.