The border between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains a closed military zone. Despite this status quo, the border delimitation commissions of the two countries held their eleventh meeting earlier this month. They agreed to begin the demarcation process at the northernmost point where the borders of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia meet, with plans to proceed systematically southwards to the border with Iran.
By Robert M. Cutler
This agreement reflects practical progress in addressing technical aspects of their shared boundaries and a broader shift towards direct bilateral negotiations as the preferred means of conflict resolution.
Since the end of 2023, the two states have moved away from relying on third-party mediation, opting for dialogue rooted in direct engagement. This approach has already yielded significant outcomes, such as confidence-building measures and initial demarcation agreements. The latest decision underscores this approach's constructive nature to overcome entrenched disagreements through incremental steps and sustained diplomatic interaction.
The International Framework and Treaty Negotiations
The shift away from reliance on third-party mediation facilitated notable progress. In April 2024, the two nations achieved a significant breakthrough by agreeing to demarcate an eight-mile stretch of their shared border in the Tavush region, a critical step towards formalising boundaries and reducing tensions. Shortly thereafter, Armenia transferred to Azerbaijan four border villages that had been under Armenian control since the early 1990s.
The return of these territories was integral to broadening the border demarcation process, as it underscored a mutual commitment to resolving key disputes. This progress was further advanced in October 2024 when Armenia’s National Assembly ratified legislation to formalise agreements on border delimitation and demarcation, embedding the outcomes of negotiations into the country's domestic legal framework.
Resisting territorial issues should pave the way for broader discussions on regional connectivity, but this has not yet come to pass. The proposed Zangezur Corridor remains a focal point in efforts to enhance economic integration and transport links across the South Caucasus. Envisioned as a link between the main body of Azerbaijan and its exclave, Nakhchivan, running through Armenia’s Syunik Province, the corridor is seen as a transformative project for the region.
Yet the corridor is not without its geopolitical complexities. Iran, in particular, views the project as challenging its regional influence. This concern heightened in December 2024, when Armenia assumed complete control of the Agarak border checkpoint, replacing Russian personnel who had overseen the site for over three decades.
The project, however, would promote economic growth in Syunik Province while facilitating more efficient trade between Europe and Asia by adding another link in the Middle Corridor. Nevertheless, Armenia's refusal to proceed has stymied progress on its realisation.
The Issue of Trials of Armenian Karabakh Leaders in Baku
Azerbaijan has commenced legal proceedings against former leaders of the so-called “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh,” maintaining that these individuals are criminals rather than prisoners of war.
Trials began in Baku on 17 January 2025. They involved 16 ex-officials, including former de facto presidents Arkadi Ghukasyan, Bako Sahakyan, Arayik Harutyunyan, the former foreign minister David Babayan, and the ex-parliamentary speaker David Ishkhanian. The charges encompass terrorism, crimes against humanity, and offences against the Azerbaijani state, with some allegations carrying the possibility of life imprisonment.
A separate trial is being conducted for Ruben Vardanyan, a Russian businessman who briefly headed the region’s separatist administration. Vardanyan faces 42 charges, including terrorism, which he denies, describing the case as politically motivated.
Azerbaijani officials have stressed that these trials are being held in line with both national and international law, reiterating their position that the defendants are being prosecuted for criminal actions rather than afforded the status of prisoners of war.
Vardanyan’s financial dealings and political ambitions remain central to understanding his trajectory from a Russian oligarch to a self-styled politician. His wealth, amassed through opaque financial networks, has long been linked to large-scale money laundering operations.
He is much more a Kremlin-aligned figure rather than the benevolent philanthropist depicted in some liberal media outlets. Vardanyan’s relocation to the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” was a calculated manoeuvre aimed at positioning himself as a challenger to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s leadership in Yerevan. He continues his strategy to leverage his political capital against the Armenian government while maintaining his ties to Moscow’s geopolitical agenda.
These trials have mobilised segments of the Armenian diaspora, particularly in Western countries, to renew irredentist claims over Karabakh. Diaspora organisations have characterised the trials as politically motivated despite the region’s reintegration into Azerbaijan following the anti-terrorist operation of September 2023. Protests outside international institutions, including the United Nations office in Yerevan, aim to internationalise the issue and continue challenging Azerbaijan’s sovereignty.
Groups such as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) and their affiliated lobbying organisations and special-interest bodies in Washington have denounced the trials, portraying them as attempts to delegitimise the self-proclaimed statehood of the so-called “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.”
This rhetoric reflects Armenia’s historic Declaration of Independence, which implicitly endorses irredentist ambitions and has shaped the conflict’s narrative for decades. While the Armenian government has largely remained silent, diaspora factions collaborate informally to amplify these claims.
Pashinyan’s Political Calculations and Diaspora Relations
On the international stage, Pashinyan seeks to balance Armenia’s engagements with key powers—Russia, the United States, and the European Union—each advancing its strategic objectives in the South Caucasus. Armenia is now attempting to cultivate political-security ties with the West while simultaneously benefitting from an unprecedented surge in trade with Russia, which has expanded from $2 billion before the Russian-Ukrainian war to $14 billion in 2024, primarily driven by the re-export of sanctioned goods.
Given Ankara's growing regional role, its parallel relations with Azerbaijan constrain Moscow’s security commitments to Armenia, its military entanglement in Ukraine, and its diminished capacity to project influence in the South Caucasus. Regional power realignments thus remain fluid, if not sometimes even volatile, such that Western states must continue to weigh their professed commitment to democratic principles against competing imperatives of geopolitical stability and energy security.
Pashinyan faces a complex challenge in balancing the demands of a vocal diaspora with his government’s recognition of the territory of the Soviet-era former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast as part of Azerbaijan. The diaspora, particularly in Western countries, has vociferously opposed Azerbaijan’s sovereignty and frames the trials of the leaders of the former so-called “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” as politically motivated.
This activism manifests in public demonstrations, lobbying efforts targeting U.S. policymakers, and continued advocacy for irredentist claims, creating friction with Armenia’s evolving strategic posture.
Pashinyan’s administration relies on institutions such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs, established in 2019, to manage these dynamics. This office aims to strengthen ties between Armenia and its diaspora, promoting state-centred identity formation and youth engagement.
However, the diaspora’s push for sanctions against Azerbaijan and its adherence to outdated territorial claims complicate Armenia’s diplomatic priorities. This tension underscores the difficulty of aligning diaspora activism with the pragmatic demands of Armenia’s shifting foreign policy.
Domestically, opposition parties and nationalist factions are critiquing Pashinyan. They accuse him of mishandling the Karabakh issue and yielding excessively to Azerbaijani demands. The government’s recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity has provoked significant discontent among these groups and amplified political dissent.
To summarise, 2024 marked a significant turning point in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which abandoned their previous reliance on third-party mediation and engaged in direct bilateral negotiations. Substantial progress was achieved in territorial demarcation, while the Zangezur Corridor re-emerged as a focal point still to be settled. This project holds considerable promise for enhancing regional trade and fostering economic integration. Still, objections from segments of the Armenian diaspora continue to pose a political challenge to official Yerevan.
The trials in Baku of former leaders of the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” have further aroused the most radical voices in the Armenian diaspora, sparking a resurgence of irredentist claims.
Pashinyan must manage dissent at home while trying to mitigate the militancy of diaspora activism abroad. At the same time, he must balance Armenia’s relationships with significant regional and global powers, each of which has its own competing interests in the South Caucasus.
The progress achieved in 2024—particularly in territorial agreements and establishing direct dialogue—suggests a mutual willingness to pursue peaceful resolutions. The return of border villages and discussions surrounding the Zangezur Corridor illustrate the potential for increased economic cooperation and interdependence.
Yet, the intensified activism of the Armenian diaspora and persistent domestic political challenges in Armenia underscore the fragility of these advances. The prospects for long-term peace in the South Caucasus hinge upon continued progress in bilateral engagement and the adequate balancing of external partnerships.