Amid the chaos between the new de facto power in Syria and key sectarian and ethnic communities - Alawites, Druze, and Kurds -tensions are intensifying. Various sources indicate a high probability that the Islamic State (ISIS) is back. Their resurgence could help unify the country,
By Ahmad Ghosn
The de facto power in Syria (HTS) has struggled to gain the trust of Syria’s diverse communities. In the Alawite heartlands of the coast, the government’s reputation has been tainted by the March massacres, where violence targeting Alawite civilians has left thousands of people dead, many of them unarmed men, women, and children. Ongoing kidnappings of Alawite women and children persist to this day.
The Druze community, too, remains alienated following armed clashes in Jaramana between Druze fighters and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the de facto military arm of the new government.
Kurds in the north continue to demand constitutional recognition. Their calls for Federalism, the Kurdish language to be adopted as an official language, and representation in state institutions have been met with silence or outright rejection.
In this volatile landscape, ISIS may unintentionally provide the glue Syria needs. The threat of jihadist resurgence is not limited to one group or one ideology—it endangers everyone. Alawites, Kurds, Druze, Sunnis, and Christians alike are potential targets, even HTS’s military core is being attacked.
It is a tactical shift from fighting each other to fighting ISIS together.
As forecasted in the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the collapse of the Asad regime is creating strategic openings for jihadist groups like ISIS and Hurras al-Din to rebuild and expand their operations. ISIS will seek to exploit the end of the Al-Assad regime in Syria to reconstitute its attack capabilities, including external plotting, and to free prisoners to rebuild their ranks.
Al-Qa‘ida’s affiliate in Syria, Hurras al-Din, is likely to strengthen its position. Despite its public announcement that the group was ordered dissolved by Al-Qa‘ida’s senior leaders in Iran, Hurras al-Din members were advised not to disarm and instead to prepare for a future conflict, noting their continued fight against Israel and its supporters.
Some remaining jihadist groups refuse to merge into the HTS Ministry of Defence. ISIS, for example, has already signalled opposition to HTS’s calls for democracy and is plotting attacks to undermine its governance.
Since the beginning of 2025, most ISIS attacks have occurred in areas controlled by the U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). However, the group made a significant escalation on May 18 by striking a security post in the eastern town of Mayadin—territory held by the newly reconstituted Syrian government.
A car bomb attack, which killed five, came just days after President Trump met with President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh and announced the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria. It also followed the start of a U.S. military drawdown in mid-April, which reduced American troop levels from 2,000 to around 700.
By May 15, ISIS had claimed responsibility for thirty-three attacks in 2025, with the tempo of operations rising sharply. While the group averaged five attacks per month in the early part of the year, that number jumped to fourteen following the withdrawal, highlighting how the shifting geopolitical landscape creates new opportunities for the group to reassert itself.
US orders to the Syrian Government
Natasha Franceschi ( Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Levant and Syria engagement in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs) in March gave eight confidence-building demands to Al-Shaibani (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates in the Syrian transitional government) in Brussels before Trump promised to ease sanctions in mid-May. The American letter sets out the prerequisites.
The priority is the continued collaboration with the U.S.-led international coalition in efforts to combat ISIS. This demand subtly endorses Syrian state legitimacy by recognising Syrian cooperation as essential to global counterterrorism efforts.
Fighting a common enemy like ISIS provides a shared purpose and may be able to rally diverse ethnic and religious communities (e.g., Kurds, Alawites, Druze) under one banner. The fact that ISIS poses a threat to various Syrian communities—Alawites, Kurds, Druze, Sunnis, and Christians—could prompt the government to declare war against the group, framing the effort as both a counterterrorism campaign and a mission to preserve the unity of Syrian territory.
This threat could be transformed into an opportunity to unify all Syrian components under a shared objective: confronting a common enemy. It is unlikely that ISIS will target the Druze community, as doing so could give Israel a pretext to expand its military operations in southern Syria under the justification of protecting its national security.
As a second point, in the American letter, the permission for the United States to carry out counterterrorism operations within Syrian territory against individuals it considers threats to its national security is highlighted.
Although accepting U.S. operations under controlled coordination may initially sound like a violation of Syrian sovereignty, this could substantially reduce the presence of other foreign militaries (e.g., Turkish-backed groups, Asian Islamist groups, Kurdish foreign groups, and Arab-Non-Syrian militant groups), consolidating authority under a unified Syrian framework.
This might eliminate jihadist elements that exploit fractured territorial control, allowing the central government to reassert control in such areas. In addition, all militant groups that do not surrender their weapons to the de facto government will be treated as ISIS.
The third point is the establishment of a unified and professional Syrian military, free of foreign fighters in senior command positions. Forming a strong, well-established national military undermines separatist military structures.
Syria also needs security decentralisation, whereby security forces, police, and the army are mobilised from the people of each region or governorate to protect it. This will help restore confidence in the government. This effect would be even more powerful if such a decentralised security force were to integrate individuals who lost family members in the coastal massacres or attacks following the collapse of state control.
Such integration reinforces a sense of power and authority among communities that have experienced persecution and exclusion. It empowers them to deter future violations and to make their voices heard within the central government and the traditionally closed security establishment.
In a country fractured by war, sectarianism, and foreign interference, the resurgence of ISIS may ironically offer the very conditions needed to unify Syria. When every community—Alawite, Druze, Kurdish, Sunni, and Christian—faces a shared existential threat, the logic of division begins to collapse.
Establishing a professional national army is the path to defeating ISIS. But such a force must be more than a name; it must be inclusive, drawing strength from every segment of Syrian society. Inclusion, however, demands purpose—and that purpose can be forged in the fire of a common enemy.
The only way to build a national army is to include all Syrian communities. How do you bring all Syrian communities together? By giving them one common enemy.
What a volatile, complicated and dangerous situation. The final two paragraphs in this excellent article present what appears to be the summary of a viable solution.