The civil war in Libya is currently on hold as Russia and Turkey are expected to reach a deal over the control of the strategically important city of Sirte. If no compromise is made, the conflict will likely escalate again, and other foreign powers are expected to become directly involved in a fight for Libya’s oil and gas reserves.

By Nikola Mikovic
The control of the oil-rich Sirte province, as well as Jufra airbase, seems to be a top priority for both Moscow and Ankara, but also for Egypt. Cairo recently warned that any attack on these two places by Turkey-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) forces would amount to crossing a “red line”, and threatened to intervene militarily to “protect its Western borders”.

Both Sirte and Jufra airbases are currently controlled by the Libyan National Army (LNA) and its de facto leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Several foreign actors, including Russia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and France, back the LNA. On the other hand, the UN-recognised government in Tripoli (GNA), supported by Turkey, Italy and Qatar, is preparing to capture the city.

Recently, Russian Foreign and Defence Ministers Sergey Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu were scheduled to meet with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu in Ankara, but the meeting was postponed. Since then, both sides have begun active preparations for a potential escalation of conflict. The LNA sent thousands of foreign mercenaries to fight in a looming battle for Sirte, while Turkey is conducting talks with the GNA for the possible use of the Misrata naval base and Al-Watiya air base.

Egypt
The Turkish military presence in Libya concerns neighbouring Egypt, as it could destabilise the North African country. Turkey supports various Islamic organisations, including those affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was banned following the army's overthrow of President Mohammed Morsi in 2013.

If Ankara sets up permanent military and naval bases in Tripolitania, it could lead to another surge in the development of radical Islamist organisations in the region. If the LNA is eventually defeated, those militants would be able to reach the western borders of Egypt. Therefore, the defeat of the LNA and its leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, would create a strategic threat for Egypt. Thus, it is no coincidence that Haftar recently flew to Cairo to negotiate with President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi and the Egyptian military.

Turkish regional interests
Even though there are speculations that Turkish interests in the region are related to its alleged neo-Ottoman ambitions, in reality, Turkey merely seeks to ensure flawless gas and oil supplies. Ankara seeks to establish control over the energy-rich eastern Mediterranean region. This area includes large reservoirs of natural gas that Egypt, Israel and Cyprus are racing to exploit.

In November 2019, Turkey signed an accord with Libya’s internationally recognised government (GNA) that seeks to create an exclusive economic zone from Turkey’s southern Mediterranean shore to Libya’s northeast coast. The main problem is that the potential economic zone includes the Greek island of Crete, which is why Athens strongly opposes the maritime deal and supports General Haftar. It is worth mentioning that a Greek navy frigate recently attempted to board and inspect a Turkish-operated Tanzanian-flagged cargo ship in the Mediterranean Sea that was suspected of carrying a new shipment of Turkish weapons or other military equipment to the GNA forces. Turkish frigates escorting the vessel, reportedly, rejected the request and warned off the Greek warship, which then shadowed the flotilla.

Zones of influence
Currently, all countries involved in the Libyan civil war are seeking to establish their own zones of influence in the energy-rich North African country. For all of them, Sirte seems to be the “red line”, as it stands on the crossroad towards vital oil installations, terminals and fields that the LNA currently controls. If Turkey-backed GNA forces manage to capture the city, Ankara will automatically have a better negotiating position.

On the other hand, Russia may be willing to trade Sirte in exchange for Turkey’s concessions in Syria, where Moscow’s client, Bashar al-Assad, aims to capture Idlib province, currently controlled by various Turkey-backed Jihadi factions.

The problem for Moscow is that other actors have their own interests in Libya, which means the Kremlin cannot make deals with Ankara as it does in Syria. For instance, France concluded oil contracts with Haftar, which means that, after a potential victory, his task could be to ensure the uninterrupted extraction of oil by the French Total Corporation. Still, one of Moscow’s main goals seems to be to spoil the Turkish gas business in Libya, to keep Ankara dependent on natural gas supplies from Russia, rather than extracting it directly from Libya’s section of the Mediterranean Sea.

At this point, Libya’s oil and gas production is reportedly suspended, although there are indications that the war-torn country may resume energy exports soon. In any case, it remains to be seen how foreign powers will agree on the redistribution of Libya’s natural resources. If no deal is made soon, Russia, Turkey, France, and Egypt, through their proxies on the ground, will likely seek military victories that would provide them with additional manoeuvring room for imminent negotiations.